For additional context, the "Nuclear Device" in question is a SNAP-19C, an RTG (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator), which generates electricity via radioactivity decay (approx 30W for this model).
Interesting to see this level of cooperation between the United States and India in 1965. Especially between the American and Indian intelligence agencies.
Historians of this time period usually describe India as having a more frigid relationship with America by the mid 1960’s with India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the United States moving closer to Pakistan. But articles like this demonstrate that the situation may have been more complex than that.
Of course geopolitics can sometimes change quickly. The leadership in the US and in India did change between 1965, the early 1970’s and the late 1970’s so that was a factor as well.
Based on only a little understanding, India's geopolitical position makes it neutral in US-Russia/Soviet and US-China rivalries. India could and can securely ignore the rivalies:
Its location isn't strategic (valuable) to those rivalries, unlike Europe or Japan; for example, India shares a border with China but the Himlayas are an uncrossable barrier for large military operations - India is no threat to and is not threatened by China in a serious way, and is far from Russia and its strategic interests.
Its enormous size and population make it very expensive to influence militarily or politically, unlike smaller countries in Africa, for example. Those factors plus India's location made them less economically dependent on the rivarly countries. And India was very poor, so it provided little value to control economically.
For India, the obvious choice was and is to stay out of those fights - they have little to gain and much to lose, both in money spent on military, and other geopolitical costs including sovereignty. Instead, they can sit securely in South Asia and invest in themselves (or the leaders can cash in on corruption).
Now India has much more value economically, but that also makes them more secure. They verbally becoming more aggressive, but they have few targets and it seems like the commonplace tactic of nationalism.
> the situation may have been more complex than that
It always is on a micro level, but India is not becoming a US ally.
> India's geopolitical position makes it neutral in US-Russia/Soviet and US-China rivalries
Neutral with the Russians, a natural ally against the Chinese. (China and India have extant border disputes. And China has been working with Pakistan to contain India for decades.)
Yeah, the problem with that argument is that the US has been actively working with Pakistan for influence in Central Asia for several decades, and has formally designated it a major non-NATO ally for the last couple decades. Which kind of undercuts any “natural” anti-China alliance with India.
> Which kind of undercuts any “natural” anti-China alliance with India
True. I've always meant to research how India and Pakistan polarised into their respective Soviet and American spheres, particularly given China and Pakistan's nuclear coöperation.
There is an interesting video by Sarah Paine on Youtube discussing the geopolitics of this. (Paraphrasing from memory) she says that the US tried to be friends with both but, because the scars of partition were so painful, this wasn't possible and they just ended up pissing off both. Apparently Pakistan was very strategic due to the presence of US listening posts and U2 bases.
Sarah Paine is an expert on China and covers this (and lots more besides). If you are at all interested in geopolitics, then I recommend watching some of her videos.
As someone who was adjacent to China studies back in it's early days in the late 2000s/early 2010s (it was not mainstream back then - everyone was concentrating on Russia and the MidEast during that era and those of us who warned about China's potential were ignored), I think she is decent, but I wouldn't really call her a China expert (she is absolutely a Naval strategy expert though). To become a policy expert in a region, you need to understand it's institutional and organizational mores.
I'd recommend following academics affiliated with the FSI@Stanford or the Fairbanks Center@Harvard instead. They tend to be the ones most in touch with policymakers on both sides of the Pacific, and are often a conduit for Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.
There has been a deluge of academics in the US entering "China studies" in the same way you saw "Mid East experts" proliferate in the 2000s and "Kremlinologists" in the 1980s-90s.
That was my take. I don't know that she calls herself that. She certainly seems very knowledgeable about China (and Japan and Russia).
From Wikipedia:
"She spent ten years on her doctoral research in Russian and Chinese history at Columbia University, which included five years of research and language study in China, Taiwan, Russia, Japan, and Australia.'
Most of her early research on China was with regards to Imperial Russia and Imperial China's rivalry in East and North Asia (ended up being published into a book back in the 1980s [0]), but was largely superficial and done in the context of US-China normalization in the 70s as a check against the USSR. Her limited Putonghua fluency is a major issue as well for someone who is a supposed China scholar.
Much of her work about that time period has been superseded by Yuhua Wang [1] and other younger and more quantitative scholars who took more of an institutionalist approach.
Even during my (limited) time, she was not viewed as a significant academic in the space - that remains to be students of John Fairbanks, Kenneth Lieberthal, Mary Gallagher, Rodrick MacFarquhar, and Yasheng Huang because a large portion of Chinese decisionmakers today either studied under them or under faculty who were advised by them in the 1980s-2000s period.
Furthermore, she has a history of media self promotion, and the loudest academics (especially on YouTube) tend to be the least regarded, because media engagements are such a time sink that it means you aren't really participating in policymaking adjacent work like Track Diplomacy.
This is why I take a dim view of her - she started off in the 70s as a Latin America researcher who pivoted to Russian history in the 80s, Japanese history in the 90s, Naval history in the 2000s when trying to get tenure, and China recently in the 2010s. These aren't the hallmarks of a domain expert and I say this as someone who studied under a couple of those. Instead, these are the hallmarks of a pop academic like Perun or Michio Kaku (if you want a STEM equivalent).
Heck, she's started trying to pivot/shoehorn India studies over the past 2 years the same way as the others becuase there is a vacuum in the field now that the most relevant contemporary India academics in the US (Raghuram Rajan, Aravind Subramanian, Karthik Subramanian, Ashutosh Varshney, Karthik Muralidharan, Nirupam Bajpai, and Milan Vaishav) have taken steps back from US academia because they are all either transitioning or transitioned into Indian policymaking roles, or like Ashley Tellis were caught in a Biden-era espionage investigation for leaking documents on behalf of China [2] around the same time his public advocacy suddenly shifted from being China-antagonistic and India-leaning to China-leaning and India-antagonistic [3] (2021-24 period). Now that "Indo-Pac Studies" is where academic funding in the policy space has started shifting towards, and the vacuum that has developed, grifters like Paine are trying to enter the field like they did China studies 15 years ago and MidEast studies 20 years ago.
Is she actually considered an expert, by other experts? I watched a couple clips of her which were recommended to me on YouTube, and she just came across as a self-congratulatory booster for the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy, the sort of end-of-history talk we all now mock when it comes from e.g. Fukuyama.
>she just came across as a self-congratulatory booster for the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy
I've watched 2 or 3 hours of videos and that isn't what I took away. She does argue that a rules based international order, free trade, democracy and liberalism is a superior system to authoritarianism, but I don't think too many people (in the West, at least) would disagree with that.
As the article mentions, this was about their shared worry of Mao's China and their nuclear advances. India then as now has a strong connection to the USSR/Russia -- they flew, and still fly, MiG planes, for example.
The US shifted to becoming de facto allied with China in the early 1970s as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and Pakistan helped with the initial backdoor diplomacy [0][1] that lead to US-Chinese normalization in the 1970s.
India, having fought a war against both Pakistan and China in the 1960s, pivoted to the Soviet Union as a result, who were also miffed at China because of the Sino-Soviet split and were looking for a bulwark.
> Historians of this time period usually describe India as having a more frigid relationship with America by the mid 1960’s with India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the United States moving closer to Pakistan
A major reason was Brzezinski - LBJ and later Carter's foreign policy czar.
He was a "realist" whose primary goal was boxing in the USSR (he spent his early childhood in Moscow during the Stalinist purge and Poland before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). As such, he pivoted the US away from India in favor of Pakistan and China.
The is why the US went from building IITs and allowing it's tech companies like Burroughs and IBM building joint ventures in 1960s India to de facto sanctions in the 1970s.
Kissinger followed a similar policy as Brzezinski, and IMO a major reason was that both grew up in pre-War Europe and their past experiences colored their views as a result.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971 [0], Soviet tech transfers to India starting in 1972 [1] that made India a semiconductor exporter to the Eastern Bloc [2] and become a mini-Taiwan before Taiwan [3], and support for India's military modernization initiative [4] under Indira Gandhi that surprised Western observers in the 1980s [5].
Finally, the NAM movement began fading from 1962 following the Sino-Indian war and died by the late 1970s with the US pivot to China [6]
Couldn't we say the US has a similar relationship with India now, at least before Trump II? We send them goodies to keep them friendly, but little geopolitical support that has significant consequence is exchanged. ?
For example, India didn't/doesn't permit military bases, if either the US or USSR wanted them. The US/USSR didn't cause an Indian victory against their neighbors (or did the Soviets have material effect on the Pakistan-Bangladesh split in 1971?).
No worries. This is my kvetching/random posting throwaway.
> Couldn't we say the US has a similar relationship with India now, at least before Trump II
Not to the same degree simply because
1. India's economy today has reached the same inflection point that the Chinese economy did in the late 2000s and early 2010s.
2. Middle Powers like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, France, and Israel have either caught up to or exceed American capacity in a number of critical technologies, and have begun mass scale capital and tech transfers to India
For 1,
India is essentially following the same trajectory as China, but 10-15 years behind because the economic isolation India faced from 1976-1991 along with the Warsaw Bloc's weakening economic heft lead to the 1990s era political and economic crisis.
India wasn't the only Soviet-leaning country that faced this issue. Even Vietnam - which used to have a HDI and GDP PPP per Capita well above the PRC until the late 1990s - suffered a lost decade for the same reasons India did due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.
For 2,
A major reason China took off in the 2000s was because Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese partners like TDK, Toshiba, Samsung, UMC, Nissan, Honda, Hyundai, etc all began transferring IP related to energy, biotech, military hardware, semiconductors, automobiles, and other STEM industries to China via JVs. For example, BYD and CATL got their head starts in the 2000d thanks to Samsung and TDK respectively transferring battery chemistry IP to them in the 2000s.
Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korea, French, and Israeli firms all started similarly mass IP and capital transfers to Indian JVs from 2014 due to a mix of economic and geopolitical tensions with China along with the fact that India has become the last large greenfield economy that Chinese competitors cannot operate within.
-------
Because of 1 and 2, India has started exhibiting similar hallmarks to China back when I was observing them closely (and being ignored) in the late 2000s and early 2010s. In the Indian policymaking space, policies similar in scale and ambition to those that the PRC adopted in the early 2010s are being constantly enacted, and just like "China Shock" 15 years ago, an "India Shock" has started arising at least in IP heavy industries.
The fact that India is now spending around $205B on infra [0] (comparable to Chinese infra spend in the early 2010s), a combined [1] $30B [2] on semiconductor development (comparable in size to the Chinese Big Fund 1.0), $12B in government provided DeepTech VC funding [3] that is being matched dollar-for-dollar by private giants like Nvidia and Qualcomm [4], and similarly sized initiatives by the Japanese [5], Korean [6], Taiwanese [7], French [8], and Israeli [9] champions, and subsidizing electronic components [10] and rare earth [11] processing upskilling, enacting China-style labor reforms [12], and opening the entire Nuclear [13] and Electricity [14] sector to 100% private investment means a lot of capacity is in the process of being built out at the same scale as was in China during the early years of the Xi admin's "Make in China" initiative.
This is why I keep harping about India - even if a large portion of the funds are misallocated, they would still end up developing an ecosystem. The same thing happened with mismanagement of funds in the first iteration of "Make in China" but administrative capacity got better.
If we mismanage the India relationship, we may inadvertently end up making another ambivalent continental scale rival like China and Russia (yes they are in a recession and nowhere near as powerful as they were at their peak, yet they can enact severe pain nonetheless).
My biggest worry about India is that they'll ally, to some degree, with China. That may be pretty far out: I've never heard it discussed, they have some competing interests and some border disputes. But those are resolvable or manageable and with the Himalayas and two oceans between them, they can each safely operate in their own domain, for the most part, without really bothering the other.
With ~1/3 of the world population and those two economies, allied they might be unstoppable if the two nationalists can hold it together. Imagine a wide-ranging trade agreement and dominating the most strategic region in the world. And what could South Asian and SE Asian countries do but go along.
...
On another note, you've amazingly generated about 50 footnotes. I always prefer them and those are credible sources, but how do you crank this out? Do you just know what you're looking for and search nytimes.com or have an LLM find the articles? I'd love to find these things that quickly.
I'm usually the person in the conversation who knows the most about this history. It's been very interesting; thanks again.
> My biggest worry about India is that they'll ally, to some degree, with China
> But those are resolvable or manageable...
It won't happen unless China gives up claims on Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The issue is China cannot because these are ethnic Tibetan regions.
Additionally, Paharis (a catch all term for the Indo-European speaking ethnic group that straddles the High Himalayas) are overrepresented in the Indian Armed Forces, and everyone in the community is 1-2 degrees separated from someone who was either impacted in one of the various Indo-China standoffs or knows people impacted by the Chinese invasion of Tibet. For a large portion of Paharis, the view on China is similar to how Poles view Russian aggression in Ukraine.
> but how do you crank this out? Do you just know what you're looking for and search nytimes.com or have an LLM find the articles
The former. I concentrated in Computer Science but got a secondary in Government primarily concentrating on an institutionalist approach to Asia and MidEast studies.
You remember that Watson quote in A Study in Scarlet about Sherlock Holmes' limited knowledge outside of a couple areas [0] - that's the same for me.
I cannot differentiate between Brad Pitt and Leonardo DeCaprio (I do watch movies and shows - I just don't know or care about the names of most actors), I don't know any song by Taylor Swift (I do listen to music, but I'm not the most knowledgeable of the latest trend), I have almost no knowledge of contemporary literature (I do read modern lit, but I'm usually 3-5 years behind the trend or zeitgeist), and I don't really follow sports aside from UFC (but I have been actively cross-training BJJ/Judo, Muay Thai/TKD, and trail running from grade school to yesterday). I also never read the news aside from a couple of primary and industry sources (eg. Reuters, Bloomberg Terminal, FT, The Economist, Axios, Politico (US and EU), TechCrunch, and a couple region specific sources) and constantly avoid narrative-based journalism (they are fun to read, but tend to waste time when trying to get to the point). I also don't use social media except hate-posting on HN or nerding out on Lobsters.
Basically, my equivalent of gossip and faux moi is the intersection of tech (I have another similarly in-depth throwaway for the technical niches I'm interested in), policy, and business.
> I'd love to find these things that quickly
If your actually interested in these topics and can afford it, I'd recommend doing a part-time masters at the Harvard Extension School in Government [1], the MLA program at Stanford [2], or the distance MA in War Studies at KCL [3].
Alternatively, intensely studying the reading list for a specific field (eg. The PPE required reading list for Balliol College, Oxford [4] or the CS tripos at Cambridge) builds the conceptual foundation needed to apply to a field.
Once you build the conceptual models and table stakes skills needed for a specific field, everything else falls into place.
Thanks for the suggestions. Reliably having time for scheduled classes is an obstacle. And there are so many things I value, I don't know if IR will make the top despite my obvious interest - and all that in addition to professional work and study. Maybe ancient Greek next (to read Homer, Socrates et. al., Greek theater in the original). Still, I'd love to learn IR fundamentals, as you say, and the Balliol reading list looks like a perfect opportunity.
I also cut everything I don't value especially - music (outside occasional jazz/classical concerts), sports, pop culture, social media, YouTube. I highly value arts but cut the time required to converse topically about them; few artists face our surreal current reality anyway. So I read literature or see film (the Criterion Channel could fill my time itself) or other arts of any provenance, in order to find the truly extraordinary and the next frontier for my mind. But even that leaves far too many options. I also began to create art myself (with no training, for a very intimate circle) - that has changed my life more than anything. That is something I highly recommend.
For exceptional IR articles you might see Just Security . Their core team is high-level IR attorneys (e.g., State Department, ICRC, etc.), and they don't hold back intellect or sophistication, though I can't talk about their a theoretical perspective. Their curated daily news brief is very useful.
This sounds like amatuer stuff, a cool idea of a CEO who has nobody to tell them 'no'.
Did they really need to plant that on top of a Himalyan mountain? Also, even if successful, how do you service it? The environment is as rough on equipment as it is on climbers.
I understand there were no satellites yet, but there were no other options?
The US also pivoted to de facto allying with China by the 1970s.
In the eyes of contemporary NatSec leadership like Kissinger (Nixon, Ford) and Brzezinski (LBJ, Carter), leveraging the Sino-Soviet split to box in the Soviets was the ideal option.
As such, from 1972-1992 the US posted soldiers in Xinjiang monitoring the USSR [0], sponsored govenrnent led tech transfers and scientific collaboration [1], provided support for Chinese military modernization [2][3], and expanded economic cooperation [4].
This also played a role as to why US intel in the 2000s assumed Xi Jinping would be pro-American [5], as he started his career working on the US supported modernization of the PLA as a junior secretary to Geng Biao [6] - who was the primary reason the Maoist regime was overthrown in the 1970s.
By the 1970s, the primary NatSec goal was blocking the USSR, and as a result realism became the primary foreign policy strategy used by the US. As such, you ended up seeing policies like ditching India and Taiwan in favor of Pakistan and China, supporting communist Somalia over not-really-communist Dergist Ethiopia during the Ogaden War, and swaying then Soviet-aligned Egypt in favor of the US by cultivating Anwar Sadat and culminating in the Camp David Accords.
Is that really an accurate description? The US continued to explicitly support Taiwan's political and military separation from China, and compelled China to agree to it - as long as Taiwan didn't try to leave China and form another country, they could remain as they were (and are).
The change was that the US had formerly recognized Taiwan as the government of all China and therefore possesor of China's UN Security Council seat, and in their deal with Mao switched to recognizing China.
The following is my understanding: The civil war ended 1949; the Communists won, and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan. That is well-known; the following is a bit of speculation: For awhile, arguably it might have been plausible to deny Communist rule and imagine the Nationalists could govern China, maybe by reinvading and another uprising like those China had experienced since 1911 - the Communists were very weak. But by 1970 the result of the civil war must have been clear and the idea of the Taiwanese Nationalists as government of mainland China was a pointless fiction.
But it was very important to the Communists and a valuable chit in a negotiation. Taiwan's hurt feelings were irrelevant - they were dependent on the US and couldn't do anything about it. Recognizing the reality of Communist mainland control had little cost and great gain.
The Taiwanese reaction [0] to US-led modernization of the PLA in the 1980s [1], the Reagan admin's snub of the Taiwanese military regime [2], it's retaliation against Taiwan for assasinating Henry Liu in Daly City [3][4], and Trump-style tariffs against Taiwan [5] that ended up [6] becoming a sanctions regime [7] lead to a sense of distrust of the US by 1980s-90s Taiwanese leadership and it's international isolation [8].
Looking back, the playbook Trump is using against China today is almost the exact same as the one the Reagan administration used against Taiwan.
> The US continued to explicitly support Taiwan's political and military separation from China, and compelled China to agree to it - as long as Taiwan didn't try to leave China and form another country, they could remain as they were (and are).
This became a US policy under the Clinton administration, with it's support for Tibetan sovereignty [10], it's rehabilitation of American ties to Taiwan [11] during collapsing ties with China [12], and the US Navy's show of force in the Taiwan Straits [13] which lead to the current Taiwan policy [14]
I don't doubt what you're saying. I didn't know about Reagan's sanctions; that is very interesting. I do know well Clinton's move in the Taiwan Strait and its consequences.
> This became a US policy under the Clinton administration
What about Carter's Taiwan Relations Act? Or was that not really implemented by Reagan?
And how did Taiwan remain independent for 20 years from Nixon to Clinton? I assumed it had to be our support. I understand the PLA was weak and inward-focused and couldn't mount a cross-Strait invasion, but someone had to trade with and arm Taiwan. Japan seems implausible for historical reasons and for their pacificism; South Korea wasn't powerful enough then, probably very focused north, and wouldn't want to antagonize the Communists; I doubt Europeans were involved so far afield ...
> What about Carter's Taiwan Relations Act? Or was that not really implemented by Reagan?
It was enacted by the "China Lobby" [0] in Congress, and Carter had no choice but to ratify it due to his crumbling popularity during his reelection campaign.
Before Israel developed staunch bipartisan support in Congress in the 1990s, the most powerful foreign lobby was the ROC's due to Chiang Kai Shek's wife Soong Mei Ling and her family - they were all products of the New England boarding school-to-Ivy League pipeline and her brother T.V. Soong was one of the largest shareholders in General Motors and DuPont and was one of the richest people in the world from the 1940s-60s [1] and was personal friends with the future Senator (and Republican presidential candidate) Barry Goldwater back when T.V. Soong helped bankroll the "Hump" during WW2 [8] (I recommend reading "The Soong Dynasty" by Seagrave to learn more).
> And how did Taiwan remain independent for 20 years from Nixon to Clinton? I assumed it had to be our support
It was partially because of the China Lobby, the PLA's de facto loss of institutional capacity due to the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent purge due to it's failure in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War [2], military pressure from India [3], Vietnam [4], North Korea [5], and the Soviet Union [6] making the PRC feel encircled, and Taiwanese attempts at economic diplomacy in then poverty stricken PRC that needed foreign capital to rebuild [9][10].
> I doubt Europeans were involved so far afield
They supported PLA modernization [7].
> probably very focused north, and wouldn't want to antagonize the Communists
The South Korean military junta in the 1980s was pro-America and aligned with the US policy to mend ties with China.
> Japan seems implausible for historical reasons
Japan aligned with US policy at the time and began mending ties with China in the early 1980s which lead to a massive counter-reaction that became the seeds of Nippon Kaigi (the nationalist movement that every Japanese PM has been a member of since the late 1990s)
I thought we’ve been led to believe that the US has sensitive radiation monitoring capabilities that could be capable of somewhat pinpointing the location of the device or at least detect it’s still there or has spread? Satellite detection?
Alpha radiation has very little in the way of penetration. I can be basically shielded by tin foil.
As the Pu238 decays it will transform into other materials that will probably emit beta and gamma radiation which could be detected. And also the shielding might get compromised over time (hopefully not!)
But at least when it was new this would not have been an option. Heat was the only detectable emission coming off it.
For additional context, the "Nuclear Device" in question is a SNAP-19C, an RTG (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator), which generates electricity via radioactivity decay (approx 30W for this model).
A "nuclear device" is doing pretty heavy lifting here.
Cesium-painted watch hands are also "nuclear devices".
If you have another source, please tell us!
There’s a diagram here, if this helps:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/e9/SNAP-19C_Moun...
https://archive.is/eTdkQ
> After losing it at the top of that mountain 60 years ago, the American government still refuses to acknowledge that anything ever happened
So, it's possible that they retrieved it, but can't say that because it would confirm that the mission existed.
and the reason for the mission.
and all of the related metadata of the details and assets of the mission.
Interesting to see this level of cooperation between the United States and India in 1965. Especially between the American and Indian intelligence agencies.
Historians of this time period usually describe India as having a more frigid relationship with America by the mid 1960’s with India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the United States moving closer to Pakistan. But articles like this demonstrate that the situation may have been more complex than that.
Of course geopolitics can sometimes change quickly. The leadership in the US and in India did change between 1965, the early 1970’s and the late 1970’s so that was a factor as well.
Based on only a little understanding, India's geopolitical position makes it neutral in US-Russia/Soviet and US-China rivalries. India could and can securely ignore the rivalies:
Its location isn't strategic (valuable) to those rivalries, unlike Europe or Japan; for example, India shares a border with China but the Himlayas are an uncrossable barrier for large military operations - India is no threat to and is not threatened by China in a serious way, and is far from Russia and its strategic interests.
Its enormous size and population make it very expensive to influence militarily or politically, unlike smaller countries in Africa, for example. Those factors plus India's location made them less economically dependent on the rivarly countries. And India was very poor, so it provided little value to control economically.
For India, the obvious choice was and is to stay out of those fights - they have little to gain and much to lose, both in money spent on military, and other geopolitical costs including sovereignty. Instead, they can sit securely in South Asia and invest in themselves (or the leaders can cash in on corruption).
Now India has much more value economically, but that also makes them more secure. They verbally becoming more aggressive, but they have few targets and it seems like the commonplace tactic of nationalism.
> the situation may have been more complex than that
It always is on a micro level, but India is not becoming a US ally.
> India's geopolitical position makes it neutral in US-Russia/Soviet and US-China rivalries
Neutral with the Russians, a natural ally against the Chinese. (China and India have extant border disputes. And China has been working with Pakistan to contain India for decades.)
Yeah, the problem with that argument is that the US has been actively working with Pakistan for influence in Central Asia for several decades, and has formally designated it a major non-NATO ally for the last couple decades. Which kind of undercuts any “natural” anti-China alliance with India.
> Which kind of undercuts any “natural” anti-China alliance with India
True. I've always meant to research how India and Pakistan polarised into their respective Soviet and American spheres, particularly given China and Pakistan's nuclear coöperation.
There is an interesting video by Sarah Paine on Youtube discussing the geopolitics of this. (Paraphrasing from memory) she says that the US tried to be friends with both but, because the scars of partition were so painful, this wasn't possible and they just ended up pissing off both. Apparently Pakistan was very strategic due to the presence of US listening posts and U2 bases.
China played a role as well. The US pivoted to China from the 1970s to 1990s due to the rivalry with the USSR.
Sarah Paine is an expert on China and covers this (and lots more besides). If you are at all interested in geopolitics, then I recommend watching some of her videos.
As someone who was adjacent to China studies back in it's early days in the late 2000s/early 2010s (it was not mainstream back then - everyone was concentrating on Russia and the MidEast during that era and those of us who warned about China's potential were ignored), I think she is decent, but I wouldn't really call her a China expert (she is absolutely a Naval strategy expert though). To become a policy expert in a region, you need to understand it's institutional and organizational mores.
I'd recommend following academics affiliated with the FSI@Stanford or the Fairbanks Center@Harvard instead. They tend to be the ones most in touch with policymakers on both sides of the Pacific, and are often a conduit for Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.
There has been a deluge of academics in the US entering "China studies" in the same way you saw "Mid East experts" proliferate in the 2000s and "Kremlinologists" in the 1980s-90s.
>I wouldn't really call her a China expert
That was my take. I don't know that she calls herself that. She certainly seems very knowledgeable about China (and Japan and Russia).
From Wikipedia:
"She spent ten years on her doctoral research in Russian and Chinese history at Columbia University, which included five years of research and language study in China, Taiwan, Russia, Japan, and Australia.'
I'd disagree with her bio on Wikipedia.
Most of her early research on China was with regards to Imperial Russia and Imperial China's rivalry in East and North Asia (ended up being published into a book back in the 1980s [0]), but was largely superficial and done in the context of US-China normalization in the 70s as a check against the USSR. Her limited Putonghua fluency is a major issue as well for someone who is a supposed China scholar.
Much of her work about that time period has been superseded by Yuhua Wang [1] and other younger and more quantitative scholars who took more of an institutionalist approach.
Even during my (limited) time, she was not viewed as a significant academic in the space - that remains to be students of John Fairbanks, Kenneth Lieberthal, Mary Gallagher, Rodrick MacFarquhar, and Yasheng Huang because a large portion of Chinese decisionmakers today either studied under them or under faculty who were advised by them in the 1980s-2000s period.
Furthermore, she has a history of media self promotion, and the loudest academics (especially on YouTube) tend to be the least regarded, because media engagements are such a time sink that it means you aren't really participating in policymaking adjacent work like Track Diplomacy.
This is why I take a dim view of her - she started off in the 70s as a Latin America researcher who pivoted to Russian history in the 80s, Japanese history in the 90s, Naval history in the 2000s when trying to get tenure, and China recently in the 2010s. These aren't the hallmarks of a domain expert and I say this as someone who studied under a couple of those. Instead, these are the hallmarks of a pop academic like Perun or Michio Kaku (if you want a STEM equivalent).
Heck, she's started trying to pivot/shoehorn India studies over the past 2 years the same way as the others becuase there is a vacuum in the field now that the most relevant contemporary India academics in the US (Raghuram Rajan, Aravind Subramanian, Karthik Subramanian, Ashutosh Varshney, Karthik Muralidharan, Nirupam Bajpai, and Milan Vaishav) have taken steps back from US academia because they are all either transitioning or transitioned into Indian policymaking roles, or like Ashley Tellis were caught in a Biden-era espionage investigation for leaking documents on behalf of China [2] around the same time his public advocacy suddenly shifted from being China-antagonistic and India-leaning to China-leaning and India-antagonistic [3] (2021-24 period). Now that "Indo-Pac Studies" is where academic funding in the policy space has started shifting towards, and the vacuum that has developed, grifters like Paine are trying to enter the field like they did China studies 15 years ago and MidEast studies 20 years ago.
[0] - https://www.routledge.com/Imperial-Rivals-China-Russia-and-T...
[1] - https://yuhuawang.scholars.harvard.edu/
[2] - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/16/indian-born-...
[3] - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/ashley-j-tellis
Is she actually considered an expert, by other experts? I watched a couple clips of her which were recommended to me on YouTube, and she just came across as a self-congratulatory booster for the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy, the sort of end-of-history talk we all now mock when it comes from e.g. Fukuyama.
>she just came across as a self-congratulatory booster for the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy
I've watched 2 or 3 hours of videos and that isn't what I took away. She does argue that a rules based international order, free trade, democracy and liberalism is a superior system to authoritarianism, but I don't think too many people (in the West, at least) would disagree with that.
As the article mentions, this was about their shared worry of Mao's China and their nuclear advances. India then as now has a strong connection to the USSR/Russia -- they flew, and still fly, MiG planes, for example.
It was mutual.
The US shifted to becoming de facto allied with China in the early 1970s as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and Pakistan helped with the initial backdoor diplomacy [0][1] that lead to US-Chinese normalization in the 1970s.
India, having fought a war against both Pakistan and China in the 1960s, pivoted to the Soviet Union as a result, who were also miffed at China because of the Sino-Soviet split and were looking for a bulwark.
> Historians of this time period usually describe India as having a more frigid relationship with America by the mid 1960’s with India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the United States moving closer to Pakistan
A major reason was Brzezinski - LBJ and later Carter's foreign policy czar.
He was a "realist" whose primary goal was boxing in the USSR (he spent his early childhood in Moscow during the Stalinist purge and Poland before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). As such, he pivoted the US away from India in favor of Pakistan and China.
The is why the US went from building IITs and allowing it's tech companies like Burroughs and IBM building joint ventures in 1960s India to de facto sanctions in the 1970s.
Kissinger followed a similar policy as Brzezinski, and IMO a major reason was that both grew up in pre-War Europe and their past experiences colored their views as a result.
[0] - https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2015/10/pakistan-and-ch...
[1] - https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-relations-...
> India ... pivoted to the Soviet Union
India may have had a relationship, but they were never a Soviet ally or anything like it. They led the Non-Aligned Movement.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971 [0], Soviet tech transfers to India starting in 1972 [1] that made India a semiconductor exporter to the Eastern Bloc [2] and become a mini-Taiwan before Taiwan [3], and support for India's military modernization initiative [4] under Indira Gandhi that surprised Western observers in the 1980s [5].
Finally, the NAM movement began fading from 1962 following the Sino-Indian war and died by the late 1970s with the US pivot to China [6]
[0] - https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/RU71B1557.pdf
[1] - https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/RU72B1581.pdf
[2] - https://www.cpushack.com/2021/08/02/the-6502-travels-the-wor...
[3] - https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/economy/story/19831015-se...
[4] - https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA089122.pdf
[5] - https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a...
[6] - https://www.jstor.org/stable/2757064
First, thanks for contributing your expertise.
Couldn't we say the US has a similar relationship with India now, at least before Trump II? We send them goodies to keep them friendly, but little geopolitical support that has significant consequence is exchanged. ?
For example, India didn't/doesn't permit military bases, if either the US or USSR wanted them. The US/USSR didn't cause an Indian victory against their neighbors (or did the Soviets have material effect on the Pakistan-Bangladesh split in 1971?).
> First, thanks for contributing your expertise
No worries. This is my kvetching/random posting throwaway.
> Couldn't we say the US has a similar relationship with India now, at least before Trump II
Not to the same degree simply because
1. India's economy today has reached the same inflection point that the Chinese economy did in the late 2000s and early 2010s.
2. Middle Powers like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, France, and Israel have either caught up to or exceed American capacity in a number of critical technologies, and have begun mass scale capital and tech transfers to India
For 1,
India is essentially following the same trajectory as China, but 10-15 years behind because the economic isolation India faced from 1976-1991 along with the Warsaw Bloc's weakening economic heft lead to the 1990s era political and economic crisis.
India wasn't the only Soviet-leaning country that faced this issue. Even Vietnam - which used to have a HDI and GDP PPP per Capita well above the PRC until the late 1990s - suffered a lost decade for the same reasons India did due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.
For 2,
A major reason China took off in the 2000s was because Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese partners like TDK, Toshiba, Samsung, UMC, Nissan, Honda, Hyundai, etc all began transferring IP related to energy, biotech, military hardware, semiconductors, automobiles, and other STEM industries to China via JVs. For example, BYD and CATL got their head starts in the 2000d thanks to Samsung and TDK respectively transferring battery chemistry IP to them in the 2000s.
Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korea, French, and Israeli firms all started similarly mass IP and capital transfers to Indian JVs from 2014 due to a mix of economic and geopolitical tensions with China along with the fact that India has become the last large greenfield economy that Chinese competitors cannot operate within.
-------
Because of 1 and 2, India has started exhibiting similar hallmarks to China back when I was observing them closely (and being ignored) in the late 2000s and early 2010s. In the Indian policymaking space, policies similar in scale and ambition to those that the PRC adopted in the early 2010s are being constantly enacted, and just like "China Shock" 15 years ago, an "India Shock" has started arising at least in IP heavy industries.
The fact that India is now spending around $205B on infra [0] (comparable to Chinese infra spend in the early 2010s), a combined [1] $30B [2] on semiconductor development (comparable in size to the Chinese Big Fund 1.0), $12B in government provided DeepTech VC funding [3] that is being matched dollar-for-dollar by private giants like Nvidia and Qualcomm [4], and similarly sized initiatives by the Japanese [5], Korean [6], Taiwanese [7], French [8], and Israeli [9] champions, and subsidizing electronic components [10] and rare earth [11] processing upskilling, enacting China-style labor reforms [12], and opening the entire Nuclear [13] and Electricity [14] sector to 100% private investment means a lot of capacity is in the process of being built out at the same scale as was in China during the early years of the Xi admin's "Make in China" initiative.
This is why I keep harping about India - even if a large portion of the funds are misallocated, they would still end up developing an ecosystem. The same thing happened with mismanagement of funds in the first iteration of "Make in China" but administrative capacity got better.
If we mismanage the India relationship, we may inadvertently end up making another ambivalent continental scale rival like China and Russia (yes they are in a recession and nowhere near as powerful as they were at their peak, yet they can enact severe pain nonetheless).
[0] - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-06-12/india-...
[1] - https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/indias-semico...
[2] - https://manufacturing.economictimes.indiatimes.com/amp/news/...
[3] - https://www.ibef.org/news/government-approves-rs-1-00-000-cr...
[4] - https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/nvidia...
[5] - https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/jap...
[6] - https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20250903PD208/samsung-india-...
[7] - https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202506240030
[8] - https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-defence-industry-is...
[9] - https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-04-19/ty-article-ma...
[10] - https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-approves-626-milli...
[11] - https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-approves-816-mln-r...
[12] - https://www.ft.com/content/b991095c-e0b9-425e-949d-ecc5d3039...
[13] - https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulat...
[14] - https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/india-...
My biggest worry about India is that they'll ally, to some degree, with China. That may be pretty far out: I've never heard it discussed, they have some competing interests and some border disputes. But those are resolvable or manageable and with the Himalayas and two oceans between them, they can each safely operate in their own domain, for the most part, without really bothering the other.
With ~1/3 of the world population and those two economies, allied they might be unstoppable if the two nationalists can hold it together. Imagine a wide-ranging trade agreement and dominating the most strategic region in the world. And what could South Asian and SE Asian countries do but go along.
...
On another note, you've amazingly generated about 50 footnotes. I always prefer them and those are credible sources, but how do you crank this out? Do you just know what you're looking for and search nytimes.com or have an LLM find the articles? I'd love to find these things that quickly.
I'm usually the person in the conversation who knows the most about this history. It's been very interesting; thanks again.
> My biggest worry about India is that they'll ally, to some degree, with China
> But those are resolvable or manageable...
It won't happen unless China gives up claims on Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The issue is China cannot because these are ethnic Tibetan regions.
Additionally, Paharis (a catch all term for the Indo-European speaking ethnic group that straddles the High Himalayas) are overrepresented in the Indian Armed Forces, and everyone in the community is 1-2 degrees separated from someone who was either impacted in one of the various Indo-China standoffs or knows people impacted by the Chinese invasion of Tibet. For a large portion of Paharis, the view on China is similar to how Poles view Russian aggression in Ukraine.
> but how do you crank this out? Do you just know what you're looking for and search nytimes.com or have an LLM find the articles
The former. I concentrated in Computer Science but got a secondary in Government primarily concentrating on an institutionalist approach to Asia and MidEast studies.
You remember that Watson quote in A Study in Scarlet about Sherlock Holmes' limited knowledge outside of a couple areas [0] - that's the same for me.
I cannot differentiate between Brad Pitt and Leonardo DeCaprio (I do watch movies and shows - I just don't know or care about the names of most actors), I don't know any song by Taylor Swift (I do listen to music, but I'm not the most knowledgeable of the latest trend), I have almost no knowledge of contemporary literature (I do read modern lit, but I'm usually 3-5 years behind the trend or zeitgeist), and I don't really follow sports aside from UFC (but I have been actively cross-training BJJ/Judo, Muay Thai/TKD, and trail running from grade school to yesterday). I also never read the news aside from a couple of primary and industry sources (eg. Reuters, Bloomberg Terminal, FT, The Economist, Axios, Politico (US and EU), TechCrunch, and a couple region specific sources) and constantly avoid narrative-based journalism (they are fun to read, but tend to waste time when trying to get to the point). I also don't use social media except hate-posting on HN or nerding out on Lobsters.
Basically, my equivalent of gossip and faux moi is the intersection of tech (I have another similarly in-depth throwaway for the technical niches I'm interested in), policy, and business.
> I'd love to find these things that quickly
If your actually interested in these topics and can afford it, I'd recommend doing a part-time masters at the Harvard Extension School in Government [1], the MLA program at Stanford [2], or the distance MA in War Studies at KCL [3].
Alternatively, intensely studying the reading list for a specific field (eg. The PPE required reading list for Balliol College, Oxford [4] or the CS tripos at Cambridge) builds the conceptual foundation needed to apply to a field.
Once you build the conceptual models and table stakes skills needed for a specific field, everything else falls into place.
[0] - https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/9097989-his-ignorance-was-a...
[1] - https://extension.harvard.edu/academics/programs/government-...
[2] - https://mla.stanford.edu/
[3] - https://www.kcl.ac.uk/warstudies/study-with-us/online
[4] - https://www.balliol.ox.ac.uk/admissions/undergraduate-admiss...
[5] - https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/teaching/1920/cst/
Thanks for the suggestions. Reliably having time for scheduled classes is an obstacle. And there are so many things I value, I don't know if IR will make the top despite my obvious interest - and all that in addition to professional work and study. Maybe ancient Greek next (to read Homer, Socrates et. al., Greek theater in the original). Still, I'd love to learn IR fundamentals, as you say, and the Balliol reading list looks like a perfect opportunity.
I also cut everything I don't value especially - music (outside occasional jazz/classical concerts), sports, pop culture, social media, YouTube. I highly value arts but cut the time required to converse topically about them; few artists face our surreal current reality anyway. So I read literature or see film (the Criterion Channel could fill my time itself) or other arts of any provenance, in order to find the truly extraordinary and the next frontier for my mind. But even that leaves far too many options. I also began to create art myself (with no training, for a very intimate circle) - that has changed my life more than anything. That is something I highly recommend.
For exceptional IR articles you might see Just Security . Their core team is high-level IR attorneys (e.g., State Department, ICRC, etc.), and they don't hold back intellect or sophistication, though I can't talk about their a theoretical perspective. Their curated daily news brief is very useful.
This sounds like amatuer stuff, a cool idea of a CEO who has nobody to tell them 'no'.
Did they really need to plant that on top of a Himalyan mountain? Also, even if successful, how do you service it? The environment is as rough on equipment as it is on climbers.
I understand there were no satellites yet, but there were no other options?
The US also pivoted to de facto allying with China by the 1970s.
In the eyes of contemporary NatSec leadership like Kissinger (Nixon, Ford) and Brzezinski (LBJ, Carter), leveraging the Sino-Soviet split to box in the Soviets was the ideal option.
As such, from 1972-1992 the US posted soldiers in Xinjiang monitoring the USSR [0], sponsored govenrnent led tech transfers and scientific collaboration [1], provided support for Chinese military modernization [2][3], and expanded economic cooperation [4].
This also played a role as to why US intel in the 2000s assumed Xi Jinping would be pro-American [5], as he started his career working on the US supported modernization of the PLA as a junior secretary to Geng Biao [6] - who was the primary reason the Maoist regime was overthrown in the 1970s.
By the 1970s, the primary NatSec goal was blocking the USSR, and as a result realism became the primary foreign policy strategy used by the US. As such, you ended up seeing policies like ditching India and Taiwan in favor of Pakistan and China, supporting communist Somalia over not-really-communist Dergist Ethiopia during the Ogaden War, and swaying then Soviet-aligned Egypt in favor of the US by cultivating Anwar Sadat and culminating in the Camp David Accords.
[0] - https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/18/world/us-and-peking-join-...
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.%E2%80%93China_Agreement_o...
[2] - https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/17/world/us-decides-to-sell-...
[3] - https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/04/archives/study-urges-us-a...
[4] - https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/26/business/us-china-investm...
[5] - https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING3128_a.html
[6] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geng_Biao
Thanks. To pick on one important word ...
> ditching ... Taiwan in favor of ... China
Is that really an accurate description? The US continued to explicitly support Taiwan's political and military separation from China, and compelled China to agree to it - as long as Taiwan didn't try to leave China and form another country, they could remain as they were (and are).
The change was that the US had formerly recognized Taiwan as the government of all China and therefore possesor of China's UN Security Council seat, and in their deal with Mao switched to recognizing China.
The following is my understanding: The civil war ended 1949; the Communists won, and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan. That is well-known; the following is a bit of speculation: For awhile, arguably it might have been plausible to deny Communist rule and imagine the Nationalists could govern China, maybe by reinvading and another uprising like those China had experienced since 1911 - the Communists were very weak. But by 1970 the result of the civil war must have been clear and the idea of the Taiwanese Nationalists as government of mainland China was a pointless fiction.
But it was very important to the Communists and a valuable chit in a negotiation. Taiwan's hurt feelings were irrelevant - they were dependent on the US and couldn't do anything about it. Recognizing the reality of Communist mainland control had little cost and great gain.
> Is that really an accurate description?
Yes.
The Taiwanese reaction [0] to US-led modernization of the PLA in the 1980s [1], the Reagan admin's snub of the Taiwanese military regime [2], it's retaliation against Taiwan for assasinating Henry Liu in Daly City [3][4], and Trump-style tariffs against Taiwan [5] that ended up [6] becoming a sanctions regime [7] lead to a sense of distrust of the US by 1980s-90s Taiwanese leadership and it's international isolation [8].
Looking back, the playbook Trump is using against China today is almost the exact same as the one the Reagan administration used against Taiwan.
> The US continued to explicitly support Taiwan's political and military separation from China, and compelled China to agree to it - as long as Taiwan didn't try to leave China and form another country, they could remain as they were (and are).
This became a US policy under the Clinton administration, with it's support for Tibetan sovereignty [10], it's rehabilitation of American ties to Taiwan [11] during collapsing ties with China [12], and the US Navy's show of force in the Taiwan Straits [13] which lead to the current Taiwan policy [14]
[0] - https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/09/world/big-military-high-t...
[1] - https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/18/world/taiwan-assails-us-a...
[2] - https://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/28/world/reagan-s-reversal.h...
[3] - https://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/11/opinion/the-long-arm-of-t...
[4] - https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/31/us/taiwan-held-liable-in-...
[5] - https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/24/business/correcting-the-t...
[6] - https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/19/business/taiwan-may-face-...
[7] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/12/business/us-puts-sanction...
[8] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/26/world/taiwan-pushes-to-re...
[9] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/06/world/china-protests-to-t...
[10] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/opinion/IHT-policy-toward...
[11] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/opinion/IHT-policy-toward...
[12] - https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/18/opinion/IHT-the-united-st...
[13] - https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/11/world/us-sending-more-shi...
[14] - https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/12/world/ambiguity-on-taiwan...
I don't doubt what you're saying. I didn't know about Reagan's sanctions; that is very interesting. I do know well Clinton's move in the Taiwan Strait and its consequences.
> This became a US policy under the Clinton administration
What about Carter's Taiwan Relations Act? Or was that not really implemented by Reagan?
And how did Taiwan remain independent for 20 years from Nixon to Clinton? I assumed it had to be our support. I understand the PLA was weak and inward-focused and couldn't mount a cross-Strait invasion, but someone had to trade with and arm Taiwan. Japan seems implausible for historical reasons and for their pacificism; South Korea wasn't powerful enough then, probably very focused north, and wouldn't want to antagonize the Communists; I doubt Europeans were involved so far afield ...
> What about Carter's Taiwan Relations Act? Or was that not really implemented by Reagan?
It was enacted by the "China Lobby" [0] in Congress, and Carter had no choice but to ratify it due to his crumbling popularity during his reelection campaign.
Before Israel developed staunch bipartisan support in Congress in the 1990s, the most powerful foreign lobby was the ROC's due to Chiang Kai Shek's wife Soong Mei Ling and her family - they were all products of the New England boarding school-to-Ivy League pipeline and her brother T.V. Soong was one of the largest shareholders in General Motors and DuPont and was one of the richest people in the world from the 1940s-60s [1] and was personal friends with the future Senator (and Republican presidential candidate) Barry Goldwater back when T.V. Soong helped bankroll the "Hump" during WW2 [8] (I recommend reading "The Soong Dynasty" by Seagrave to learn more).
> And how did Taiwan remain independent for 20 years from Nixon to Clinton? I assumed it had to be our support
It was partially because of the China Lobby, the PLA's de facto loss of institutional capacity due to the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent purge due to it's failure in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War [2], military pressure from India [3], Vietnam [4], North Korea [5], and the Soviet Union [6] making the PRC feel encircled, and Taiwanese attempts at economic diplomacy in then poverty stricken PRC that needed foreign capital to rebuild [9][10].
> I doubt Europeans were involved so far afield
They supported PLA modernization [7].
> probably very focused north, and wouldn't want to antagonize the Communists
The South Korean military junta in the 1980s was pro-America and aligned with the US policy to mend ties with China.
> Japan seems implausible for historical reasons
Japan aligned with US policy at the time and began mending ties with China in the early 1980s which lead to a massive counter-reaction that became the seeds of Nippon Kaigi (the nationalist movement that every Japanese PM has been a member of since the late 1990s)
[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_lobby_in_the_United_Stat...
[1] - https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mill-1-timeli...
[2] - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10670564.2019.15...
[3] - https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/08/world/india-and-china-cit...
[4] - https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/14/world/peking-hanoi-intere...
[5] - https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/05/world/china-turns-attenti...
[6] - https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/21/world/soviet-china-talks-...
[7] - https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/14/archives/china-looking-to...
[8] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hump
[9] - https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/20/world/first-china-taiwan-...
[10] - https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/13/world/taiwan-to-allow-mor...
I forgot about the China Lobby. I could go on, but even I need to take a break. I don't remember ever being outlasted. Have a good day/night!
No worries! It's a lazy Sunday so I have time to kill and scratch my academia itch.
I thought we’ve been led to believe that the US has sensitive radiation monitoring capabilities that could be capable of somewhat pinpointing the location of the device or at least detect it’s still there or has spread? Satellite detection?
Alpha radiation has very little in the way of penetration. I can be basically shielded by tin foil.
As the Pu238 decays it will transform into other materials that will probably emit beta and gamma radiation which could be detected. And also the shielding might get compromised over time (hopefully not!)
But at least when it was new this would not have been an option. Heat was the only detectable emission coming off it.
> I can be basically shielded by tin foil.
Comically correct, but I suspect you meant to say "It can..."
Oops yes :) That's what I meant of course.