We recently wrote about moving away from OVMF (~1M lines of C) to very minimal and hyperspecific firmware (300 lines of assembly)[1] for our specific confidential VM machine targets, and the idea that "popular" does not automatically mean "secure". You can point an LLM at any large codebase and it will find vulnerabilities, so "patch the planet" isn't very scalable. You can instead just write hyperspecific, small codebases and throw all the security practices at it - like LLMs (economical if it's small), fuzzing, formal methods etc.
We need a clean start. A lot of layers can and should be rebuilt, and even if you do it without reducing functionality, I feel like in a lot of cases like we’ll be able to cut down the code significantly.
When I explain software bloat to non technical people, I say imagine you built a 10 story building, but every few years it was a story at a time with the renovations along the way.
Like there’s gonna be a lot of inefficiencies. Yea I know we refactor. But doing a clean slate rebuild. Knowing exactly what you need based on real world experience, it should work to really streamline stuff.
I've always been downright suspicious of the creation of UEFI. It executes code before the operating system but doesn't really provide a hardware abstraction layer like BIOS does. Most operating system don't use BIOS or any other software layer and configure the hardware themselves. Why is it there then?
And unlike BIOS which is relatively small UEFI is "full-fat" almost the size of an operating system itself. It can even run its own applications.
The 1 million lines of C code comprising UEFI are riddled with bugs and this is just one of them. No doubt LLMs will be able to uncover a lot more of them.
> doesn't really provide a hardware abstraction layer like BIOS does
I'm not really sure what this means. UEFI provides a consistent interface to access storage devices, network devices, input devices, and access to a framebuffer. How else would bootloaders work?
Well, looking at the mess that is most arm/arm64 SBCs, I understand why it’s nice to have a standard interface that can run (eg) grub. Can UEFI be much smaller? Also yes.
> There are important caveats and limitations to exploiting this latest vulnerability. As noted, some level of control over a local network is a prerequisite. That likely limits exploitation to insiders or attackers, such as nation-states or ransomware operators, who manage to gain low-level access inside a network and are looking for a way to elevate system rights.
This one seems weird. PXE-boot is such a fragile process in and off itself this doesn't strike me as end-of-the-world. If an attacker has enough presence on your network to send a targeted ICMP packet, they almost certainly could also fool around with your PXE-booting servers some other way.
Yeah I'm actually not terribly worried about the server scenario, but having a way to get code exec in the firmware lets you defeat measured boot, which means this is a Bitlocker bypass in the default config.
Except that a sensible deployment of PXE boot would also have the servers attest to their state prior to giving them any secrets. This vulnerability breaks this workflow.
The PHP CVS were originally reported as perfect 10s and in theory allow remote access (practically all of the internet). This requires physical hardware access (practically 0 of the internet).
Those original PHP 10s were negotiated down into a 9.2 by disclosure.. so maybe this'll be an 8.7 soon.
Well because some php configurations had an absurdly low default max upload size, which made the rce way harder.
Plesk for example ships with 2m for some reason.
CVSS is an imperfect system. Most of the time it gets the idea of how severe an issue is across, but once you go above an 8, maybe an 8.5, there are some perverse incentives at play. Even with newer versions of the framework coming out over the years, there have always been gaps.
Even before AI, there was prestige in being able to say that you (or your team) found a 9.2 in some major piece of software. You could put that on your resume in some specializations.
Now with AI vulnerability scanning being so hyper-commercialized (but not yet fully commoditized), this is cranked way up since there are more monied interests involved, and many of them are probably trying to make a quick buck before LLM-based vulnerability scans are a commodity (for better or worse).
Several large bare-metal hosting companies. Not over the open Internet, but that doesn't matter if the management networks are shared and the price of admission a single server rental.
so how many firmwares actually compile in this ICMP stuff? because edk2 builds in a way that it will only package the stuff actually used. u include protocola and handles etc.
personally never found a reason why to include icmp in there for what i was building using edk2.
as others noted pxe is also already very fragile and enough network access to perform the icmp attack is likely enough access to mitm the entire pxe run and slap in your own boot image or modules etc.
i dont think most servers boot using PXE so that is grossly overstated? or would it include the attacker going into the boot menu and selecting to pxe boot... because why use an exploit then if you can just point it to your own server and again pull the image like that.
all u need is a konboot or similar tool inserted to then subsequently load the original image -_-
Suppose the server only boots signed images created by itself, which the PXE server happens to serve. You cannot just switch or mess with the menu. But if you can exploit the boot chain before any Secure Boot components run, then you might find your way in.
We recently wrote about moving away from OVMF (~1M lines of C) to very minimal and hyperspecific firmware (300 lines of assembly)[1] for our specific confidential VM machine targets, and the idea that "popular" does not automatically mean "secure". You can point an LLM at any large codebase and it will find vulnerabilities, so "patch the planet" isn't very scalable. You can instead just write hyperspecific, small codebases and throw all the security practices at it - like LLMs (economical if it's small), fuzzing, formal methods etc.
[1] https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-10-25-less-is-more
Yea I really like this idea.
We need a clean start. A lot of layers can and should be rebuilt, and even if you do it without reducing functionality, I feel like in a lot of cases like we’ll be able to cut down the code significantly.
When I explain software bloat to non technical people, I say imagine you built a 10 story building, but every few years it was a story at a time with the renovations along the way.
Like there’s gonna be a lot of inefficiencies. Yea I know we refactor. But doing a clean slate rebuild. Knowing exactly what you need based on real world experience, it should work to really streamline stuff.
I've always been downright suspicious of the creation of UEFI. It executes code before the operating system but doesn't really provide a hardware abstraction layer like BIOS does. Most operating system don't use BIOS or any other software layer and configure the hardware themselves. Why is it there then?
And unlike BIOS which is relatively small UEFI is "full-fat" almost the size of an operating system itself. It can even run its own applications.
The 1 million lines of C code comprising UEFI are riddled with bugs and this is just one of them. No doubt LLMs will be able to uncover a lot more of them.
> doesn't really provide a hardware abstraction layer like BIOS does
I'm not really sure what this means. UEFI provides a consistent interface to access storage devices, network devices, input devices, and access to a framebuffer. How else would bootloaders work?
Well, looking at the mess that is most arm/arm64 SBCs, I understand why it’s nice to have a standard interface that can run (eg) grub. Can UEFI be much smaller? Also yes.
The astronauts on the ISS must be breathing a sigh of relief, I imagine.
> There are important caveats and limitations to exploiting this latest vulnerability. As noted, some level of control over a local network is a prerequisite. That likely limits exploitation to insiders or attackers, such as nation-states or ransomware operators, who manage to gain low-level access inside a network and are looking for a way to elevate system rights.
This one seems weird. PXE-boot is such a fragile process in and off itself this doesn't strike me as end-of-the-world. If an attacker has enough presence on your network to send a targeted ICMP packet, they almost certainly could also fool around with your PXE-booting servers some other way.
Yeah I'm actually not terribly worried about the server scenario, but having a way to get code exec in the firmware lets you defeat measured boot, which means this is a Bitlocker bypass in the default config.
Yeah but that just lets them replace the OS that gets booted.
This gives the attacker access at the UEFI level and above -- they can use it to produce false attestations.
Do any of the locked down consoles or phones use a vulnerable UEFI implementation by any chance?
Except that a sensible deployment of PXE boot would also have the servers attest to their state prior to giving them any secrets. This vulnerability breaks this workflow.
How is this a 9.5 if php2shell was a 9.2?
The PHP CVS were originally reported as perfect 10s and in theory allow remote access (practically all of the internet). This requires physical hardware access (practically 0 of the internet).
Those original PHP 10s were negotiated down into a 9.2 by disclosure.. so maybe this'll be an 8.7 soon.
Well because some php configurations had an absurdly low default max upload size, which made the rce way harder. Plesk for example ships with 2m for some reason.
CVSS is an imperfect system. Most of the time it gets the idea of how severe an issue is across, but once you go above an 8, maybe an 8.5, there are some perverse incentives at play. Even with newer versions of the framework coming out over the years, there have always been gaps.
Even before AI, there was prestige in being able to say that you (or your team) found a 9.2 in some major piece of software. You could put that on your resume in some specializations.
Now with AI vulnerability scanning being so hyper-commercialized (but not yet fully commoditized), this is cranked way up since there are more monied interests involved, and many of them are probably trying to make a quick buck before LLM-based vulnerability scans are a commodity (for better or worse).
Check it yourself: paste CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H into a CVSS analyser and read the descriptions of the related categories.
They can't really call it a 12...
“These go to eleven”
Fools! That is why I don't keep my servers on the planet Earth. Mua ha ha ha ha....
Another breathless fearmongering. "threatens"? No, I don't think network booting is even all that common outside of extremely niche scenarios.
Instead, it applies only to organizations with machines that boot from local networks, or conceivably from Internet-connected resources.
Who is PXE-booting over the open Internet!?
Several large bare-metal hosting companies. Not over the open Internet, but that doesn't matter if the management networks are shared and the price of admission a single server rental.
> No, I don't think network booting is even all that common outside of extremely niche scenarios.
It's incredibly common though? I've run across it and I work on games and client software, not server stuff.
so how many firmwares actually compile in this ICMP stuff? because edk2 builds in a way that it will only package the stuff actually used. u include protocola and handles etc.
personally never found a reason why to include icmp in there for what i was building using edk2.
as others noted pxe is also already very fragile and enough network access to perform the icmp attack is likely enough access to mitm the entire pxe run and slap in your own boot image or modules etc.
i dont think most servers boot using PXE so that is grossly overstated? or would it include the attacker going into the boot menu and selecting to pxe boot... because why use an exploit then if you can just point it to your own server and again pull the image like that.
all u need is a konboot or similar tool inserted to then subsequently load the original image -_-
Suppose the server only boots signed images created by itself, which the PXE server happens to serve. You cannot just switch or mess with the menu. But if you can exploit the boot chain before any Secure Boot components run, then you might find your way in.