I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app.
I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
I have family conversation in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. That should be my choice.
signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.
I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
Aren’t they implying that the users on the other side of your chats explicitly grant that access to their ai agent?
I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app.
I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
You wouldn't, but someone you're talking to has connected the desktop app to their signal account, and is also using Claude in YOLO mode.
I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
Privacy and anonymity are different things.
Nah if they are "serious" they offer both. It's a scam until proven otherwise.
Ah yes, Signal is a scam, this is a serious position held by serious people.
I would like all of the money I've given to Signal back in that case, please.
https://signal.org/donate/
Probably because that would open up the platform to a flood of spam bots.
Should be buyable desktop only with volume licenses.
If you want real security and anonymity use SimpleX. Recommended by Whonix, which is recommended by Edward Snowden.
Signal is for pretend-security.
Last I heard, that was coming at a later date
Weird how to signal macos is the least private OS in respect to this topic. Most people consider apple to provide the most private and secure os's.
Tangential article for those on Apple platforms - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-you-can-now-ex...
As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
[0]: https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/
I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
Bad headline. Everyone is "serious about protecting your privacy". Even vendors who store your passwords in plaintext say that.
Privacy is not the same thing as security.
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
I have family conversation in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. That should be my choice.
Signal is run by a careless, low effort team.
It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.
How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?
Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?
This is a very unfocused team.
signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
Out of curiosity, since signal has a native iOS app, why don't they use the Apple's Catalyst framework to port the same app to macOS?
Signal is great for sure, but is is really useful when WhatApp (which uses signal under the hood) archives all your conversations?
WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.